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This study analyzes and compares the earnings management behaviour 
European countries taking into consideration the particularities and differences of both markets. The 
paper fills this gap in the literature as it analyzes the context of earnings management in the 
developing Eastern countries a
This is the first study which compares these two markets.  The results show that companies in the 
European countries included in the study, engage in earnings management, in particular in 
earnings practices. Around 70% of the companies from Eastern and Western European countries 
manage earnings to downward. Mean ranks from the Kruskal Wallis test indicate lower manipulation 
in Western European countries than in Eastern European c
of the European countries based on the cluster analysis we confirm that Eastern European countries 
follow the German companies’ way of managing earnings. Finally, time
earnings manage
countries. Nevertheless, we detect two main tendencies for all European countries: firstly, a decrease 
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In Europe, for one side, we can observe globalisation as a 
“mega-trend”. Globalisation is becoming increasingly 
significant, especially now at the beginning of a new century, 
when countries are trying to eliminate borders. Globalisation 
provides great opportunities for business. Companies can 
easily connect with counter partners and negotiate different 
issues. It entails a significant reduction of trade barriers. Free 
trade agreements are a typical characteristic and a force of this 
development, among other characteristics and opportunities.
On the other hand, indeed we may still observe important 
differences between Western and Eastern European countries 
(also known as communist Europe). Such differences m
come from environmental factors such as: entrepreneurial 
culture, the financial and welfare systems, the legal framework 
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nd its comparison to the Western well
ountries. Additionally, in the heterogeneity 
ment does vary in time and in extent for Eastern as well as for Western European 
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Herrberg and Moxon-Browne (1995) underline the importance 
of the collapse of communist regimes
their subsequent gradual transition towards market economics 
and political pluralism. It has created a new insecurity in both 
parts of the European continent. It has brought a new set of 
problems for Western European
high unemployment, and political volatility, among others 
(Herrberg and Moxon-Browne, 1995). Sitter (2003) clarifies, 
more than a decade after the collapse of communism in Eastern 
European countries the question of party system 
and stability remains somewhat contentious. Svedsen (2003) 
adds that even though the former Eastern Bloc countries have 
started implementing market-based reforms since 1989, the 
stock of trust has presumably not changed yet as it may take 
centuries to build. Moreover, the 
Union by Eastern European countries creates a significant 
influence and pressure on relations between Eastern and 
Western European countries. It also creates integrity. 
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However, the method of just implementing the EU model in 
newly integrated countries, without seriously taking local 
realities into consideration, is not a viable one. Finally, the 
history, culture, religion, economic and social development in 
Eastern European countries had obviously taken a different 
course from that of Western Europe. Therefore, these 
differences may have influenced on the earnings management.  
Additionally, Western European markets are well-investigated 
in terms of the earnings management. There is a systematic 
research on earnings management in different countries, see 
for example, studies of Jeanjean (2000), Gill-de-Albornoz and 
Illueca (2005), Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), Cormier 
and Martinez (2006), Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006), 
García Osma and Noguer (2007), Poli (2013), Basilico (2014), 
Dilger and Graschitz (2015), Hooghiemstra et al. (2015), 
among others. However, there is barely touched earnings 
management in European emerging countries. Some 
descriptive studies can be found based on the sample from 
emerging countries, see studies of Wiercińska (2008), 
Wojtowicz (2010), Gierusz (2010), Welc (2011). As well as, 
we may find only few empirical research based on the sample 
from Eastern European countries, see studies of  Wojtowicz 
(2015), Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2017a), Callao, Jarne 
and Wroblewski (2017b), Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski 
(2017c). Nevertheless, none of the study compares both 
markets. No longer Europe can be designate only by Western 
part. These developing markets increasingly gain importance 
in the European panorama.  
 
Besides, not only, there are no comparative studies between 
Eastern and Western European countries, but there is 
surprisingly little space devoted to the comparative studies 
across different countries in general. Therefore, the objective 
of the study is to compare earnings management behaviour 
between Eastern and Western European countries taking into 
consideration the particularities and differences of both 
markets. The context of earnings management in the 
developing countries and its comparison to the Western well-
developed countries may give important insights into the 
earnings management literature. The study aims to identify 
similarities and differences among European countries in 
earnings management. The importance of the European 
developing countries for the global European economy 
underlines the need for including them in the comparative 
study. Given the dissimilarities among both European markets 
(Western and Eastern), the country-specific variables, 
including the level of connection between accounting and 
taxation, owners’ expectations, the company’s image, different 
earnings targets, accounting and legal tradition, acquisition of 
potential investors, differences within national audit 
environments, the way of the response to the world financial 
crisis and the process of enlargement of the European Union, 
important differences in terms of history, culture, economy, we 
expect to find dissimilarities with respect to the earnings 
management across these two groups of countries. Therefore, 
first, we examine and compare the earnings management in 
eight European countries: four developing Eastern European 
countries: the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia; 
and four Western: Germany, France, Spain and the UK. We 
analyze the scope and the sign of the earnings management 
trying to determine earnings manipulation for different 
European countries. Second, we rank and cluster countries 
looking for similarities, connections and differences among 
them. The current scenario may indicate significant differences 
among countries.  
Finally, we focus on the changes in earnings management over 
time. The question arises whether the manipulation changes 
the same of different way within different European countries. 
Can we find similar tendencies over markets of Eastern and 
Western European countries? The empirical results indicate 
that companies in the European countries included in the study, 
engage in earnings management, in particular in decreasing 
earnings practices. Around 70% of the companies from Eastern 
and Western European countries manage earnings to 
downward. Mean ranks from the Kruskal Wallis test indicate 
lower manipulation in Western European countries than in 
Eastern European countries. 
 
Additionally, the cluster analyses confirmed significantly 
different earnings manipulation between France, Spain, the UK 
and the Eastern European countries and Germany. However, in 
the heterogeneity of the European countries we perceived that 
Eastern European countries, to a certain extent, have 
assimilated the German companies’ way of managing earnings, 
as cluster analyses confirmed that Eastern European countries 
came up in the same cluster as German companies. Finally, 
time-line analysis revealed that earnings management does 
vary in time and in extent for Eastern as well as for Western 
European countries. Moreover, we conclude that there is a 
difference in manipulation over the years among Eastern and 
Western European countries. Nevertheless, we detect two main 
tendencies: firstly, a decrease in manipulation between 
2003/2004 and 2007; and between 2008 and 2009 we observe 
increases in manipulation for all European countries.  
 
Therefore, we contribute to the earnings management literature 
at least in three important ways. First, comparative study may 
help to understand Western and Eastern markets in terms of the 
earnings management. It may reveal important characteristics 
of both markets, and help to illustrate links between both parts 
of Europe. It has not been done to date. Secondly, this work 
may also provide insights for those interested in comparative 
studies between different countries, as comparative studies are 
barely observed in earnings management literature. Finally, the 
existence of earnings management in firms from emerging 
Eastern European countries is not well documented. Therefore, 
present study may also contribute to the earnings management 
literature of developing Eastern European countries. The 
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
we present literature review describing prior research on 
comparative studies on earnings management. Section 3 
describes sample selection and methodology. Section 4 
provides the empirical results. Finally, section 5 concludes this 
paper with conclusions.  
 
Literature review: The investigation of earnings management 
began in the US with the study of Healy (1985) and DeAngelo 
(1986) and it has increased with time. Numerous papers have 
investigated, both theoretically and empirically, diverse 
research questions on the topic of earnings management. In 
Europe, the investigation on earnings management appeared at 
the end of 90, as a response to the US investigators. The 
tendency of growing number of investigation on the topic of 
earnings management has been observed over next decades, 
see Figure 1. At present, a sample based on the European 
countries is a common source of sample to measure earnings 
management. Additionally, within the wide spectrum of 
studies from the Europe, we may observe that a common 
practice of researchers is the use of a one-country selection 
sample.  
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The authors in their study focus on one particular market. They 
respond to a special situation, such as for example, the pattern 
of discretionary accruals over time and their impact on 
earnings management on long-run stock price performance of 
IPOs in companies from Netherland (Roosenboom, Van der 
Goot and Mertens, 2003), the effect of price regulation on the 
accounting policy of Spanish electricity companies (Gill-de-
Albornoz and Illueca, 2005), the information uncertainty 
associated with earnings management in German companies 
(Burghof and Johannsen, 2006), the effect of audit efforts on 
earnings management in Greece companies (Caramanis and 
Lennox, 2008), among other studies. Nevertheless, the 
literature on earnings management highlights the importance 
of the comparative studies that focus on more than one country 
in the research. Comparative studies are helpful in terms of 
evaluating the general tendencies of the companies from 
different countries and the existence of earnings manipulation. 
They are based on the moderate number of cases looking for 
the patterns of similarities and differences across the samples 
(Ragin, 1994). Figure 2 illustrates the scope of studies on 
earnings management based on the number of countries 
included into the earnings management analysis.  
 
 
Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014b) investigated more than 
200 papers within the period of 1985 and 2013. The results are 
pretty clear, despite the importance of the comparative studies, 
there is still a small number of a papers focused on earnings 
management comparing activity of the companies within the 
different countries. Only 8% of all papers on earnings 
management are based on the multi-country sample (the study 
based on the sample with more than one country origin). The 
earnings management studies mainly use data of the unique 
country sample. In Table 1 based on the study of Callao, Jarne 
and Wroblewski (2014) we present the revision of the most 
important studies based on the multi-country European 
samples (comparative studies). We also have included some 
recent studies. We show the sample origin and the objective of 
the study. Finally, it is observed that earnings management in 
Eastern Europe is still ongoing. Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski 
(2017a, 2017b, 2017c) and Wojtowicz (2015), authors that 
focused their research on the developing European countries, 
confirm that earnings management in companies from 
emerging Eastern European countries was the subject of only 
several studies, mainly theoretical, see Table 2. There are no 
comparative studies among developing Eastern European 
countries.   
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Sample : The sample comprises non-financial firms from eight 
European countries: four Western European countries and four 
developing Eastern European countries. In particular, we select 
four Western European countries: France, Germany, Spain and 
United Kingdom; and four emerging Eastern European 
countries: Poland, Hungry, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. 
Our research period comprise years from 2003 to 2009. We 
select these countries from the following reasons. First, 
economic statistics reveal that both four Western and four 
Eastern European countries represent the most developed 
countries from each part of Europe (see data for Gross 
Domestic Product, interest rate, inflation rate, among others1). 
                                                 
1 See data: World Bank database (www.worldbank.org/), World Economic 
Forum database (www.weforum.org), World Investment Report 
At the same time, the figures reveal important differences 
between the blocs of Eastern and Western Europe. There is a 
still economic gap between the two parts of Europe. Given the 
above economic circumstances we are investigating earnings 
management in the most economically developed and strongest 
Western and Eastern European countries and their behaviour in 
terms of manipulation. Second, all eight European countries 
are European Union members. Western European countries 
were incorporated into the structures of the EU long ago. 
France and Germany have been EU member states in the 
beginning, the UK was incorporated in 1973, and Spain in 
1986. On the other hand, emerging countries jointed the 
European Union in 2004 (May of 2004), which still are 
adjusting and looking their place in European competition. 
Therefore, our sample includes the most ‘important’ EU 
member states both from Western and Eastern part of Europe 
and, as shown, from different integration moments. Entry into 
the European Union by Eastern European countries has created 
a significant influence and pressure on relations between 
Eastern and Western European countries. Therefore, it may 
have also important effect on the earnings manipulation.   
 
Third, the selected countries represent three distinct legal 
traditions in Europe: French code law (France and Spain), 
German code law (Germany, and Eastern European countries) 
and English common law (UK) (David and Brierley, 1985; 
LaPorta et al., 1998; Funken, 2003; Jaakko and Tapani, 2005; 
Deakin, 2008; Bernitz, 2010; Smits, 2010). Different legal 
traditions recognize different sources of law and thus prescribe 
different theories and methods for the administration of the 
companies. These differences may have an impact on diverse 
areas of the company such as: starting a business: number of 
procedures, time, cost, and minimum capital requirement; 
differences in protecting investors and getting credit could also 
be attributed to legal origin; distinct ways of supervising of 
markets; protecting the rights of workers; the differences in 
paying taxes, among others (see Grossfeld, 1990). 
Additionally, literature confirms that different legal traditions 
have a significant influence on the existence and scope of 
earnings management (see for example, La Porta et al., 1997; 
Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Ball, Kothari and Ashok, 2000; 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003; Daske and Gebhardt, 2006, 
among others)2. We have 42,381 companies from Western 
European countries; and 4,627 companies from Eastern 
European countries. Our total sample includes 47,008 
companies, which make up 339,048 firm-year observations 
(for each firm we have seven observations: 7 years), see Table 
3. Our research is based on non-consolidated financial 
statements. The descriptive statistics of assets and revenues are 




While there is no a perfect way to measure earnings 
management, drawing on the existing earnings management 
literature and taking into account the particularities of 
emerging Eastern European countries, we base on accruals 
models methodology and we estimate discretionary accruals 
                                                                                      
(http://unctad.org/en/), Trading Economics database 
(www.tradingeconomics.com), European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu), 
Doing Business database (www.doingbusiness.org).  
2 Additionally, we focused on the limited year's data as we had some data 
collections' problems related to some variables. Unfortunately, emerging 
Eastern European countries are not widely presented with full data in Amadeus 
database or other source of information.  
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using a cross-sectional version of the Yoon and Miller model 
(2002), see equation 1. Based on the R², standard error of 
estimated variables, the p-value (which represents the 
statistical significance of variables), as well as the predicted 
sign, we confirm that the Yoon and Miller model (2002) is a 
reliable and solid model to measure the discretionary part of 
accruals for Eastern and Western European countries.  
 
  (1) 
where:  
itTA  - Total Accruals in year t  
1itA  - Total Assets in year t -1 
itREV  - Annual change in revenues in year t 
itREC  - Annual change in receivables accounts in year t 
itEXP  - Change in operating expenses excluding non-cash 
expenses in year t 
itPAY  - Change in payables accounts in year t 
1itNCASH  - Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year 
t-1 
itGPPEGRW  - A rate of growth in gross property, plant and 
equipment in year t 
it  - The error term 
Source: Yoon and Miller (2002) 
 
To test whether differences in earnings management between 
Western and Eastern European countries exist, we calculate the 
value of discretionary accruals in absolute terms for firms in 
each country3. Additionally, to identify whether European 
companies manage earnings to decrease or increase them, we 
calculate the number of companies that showed positive and 
negative discretionary accruals per country and year. We also 
calculate the mean of discretionary accruals in positively 
ranked firms and the mean of negatively ranked firms.  
 
Moreover, after verifying that the variable does not follow a 
normal distribution (see Annex 2), we run the Kruskal Wallis 
non-parametric test using the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals. The test is used for comparing independent samples 
of our eight countries of our two blocks of Western and 
Eastern European countries.  We also perform cluster analyses. 
By cluster analysis, we look to figure out, whether the results 
of our eight sample companies can be divided into distinct 
groups. Using the absolute values of discretionary accruals we 
perform cluster procedure from two different perspectives: 
a cluster analysis by year; and a cluster analysis by the 
combined period of 2003-2009.   Finally, we compare the 
behaviour of Eastern and Western European companies over 
time. We look for any significant differences in the level of 
discretionary accruals for our study period of 2003-2009. To 
this end, based on the value of discretionary accruals in 
absolute terms for firms in each country, we run Friedman 
non-parametric tests for each country. Friedman’s test allows 
us to present an ordering by years (for each country) in terms 
of the level of earnings management. In this way we can 
evaluate if earnings management has increased or decreased 
over the years. 
                                                 
3 The dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
because we want to measure the magnitude of manipulation without regard to 
its sign.  
RESULTS 
 
Comparing the means of earnings management, sign and 
magnitude of earnings management among european 
countries: We compare the means of earnings management 
among European countries. Annex 3 shows the descriptive 
statistics on the regression by Yoon and Miller model (2002). 
We may confirm that European companies manage earnings, 
as we expected. Additionally, the results show managing 
earnings to decrease them. Previous earnings management 
literature confirms decreasing earnings practices in samples 
form other countries, see studies of Liberty and Zimmerman 
(1986), Jones (1991), Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), Key 
(1997), among othres.  Table 4 shows the results of the 
percentage of the companies with positive and negative sign of 
discretionary accruals, as the sign of earnings management 
may help to understand the why managers manipulate 
earnings. We may observe a very high percentage of 
observations with negative discretionary accruals for both 
markets:  
Eastern and Western European countries. It indicates of 
downward manipulation of earnings by managers of European 
companies. The highest percentage of companies showing 
negative discretionary accruals is observed for German sample 
ranges from 80% to 87%, followed by Slovakia and the UK 
companies with the proportion of negative sign of 
discretionary accruals, ranging from 71% to 75%. Finally, 
France, Spain, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary show 
similar, also high, negative to positive percentages, rounding 
62-69% for negative to 31-37% for positive means.  Therefore, 
Eastern and Western European companies during our analysis 
period have generated a competitive advantage by decreasing 
earnings mechanism. Different causes influence managers’ 
decisions to decrease earnings. Literature points out those 
managers may decrease earnings to meet bonus targets (Healy, 
1985) or to protect their job (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; 
Arya, Glover and Sunder, 2003). These two incentives can be 
very relevant in terms of the explanation of our results in 
increasing European competition generated by the 
incorporation of the new members into the European Union 
structures. Another possible reason for decreasing earnings 
may come from the firm’s environment. Firms often attempt to 
control fluctuations in reported earnings and steer them to 
levels they consider desirable (Tokuga and Sakai, 2011). We 
may observe important fluctuations related to European 
background of the companies.  Companies may want to opt for 
“hiding” some of their earnings (decreasing earnings) for 
reporting in a future period when earnings are lower and the 
marginal impact of a higher report is greater. More 
specifically, managers decrease earnings in periods when 
business performance is favourable and earnings are 
comparatively high (Ronen and Sadan, 1981; Lambert, 1984).  
 
Increased European competition helps to obtain opportunities 
for doing business for the companies created by the dynamic 
markets.  Moreover, decreasing earnings is additionally 
employed to assure investors of a steady earnings flow 
(George and Furstenberg, 2006), which is significant for our 
sample countries. Finally, decreasing earnings management 
may also be observed in the companies which use it to lower 
owners’ expectations, see for example studies of Degeorge, 
Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999), Kasznik and McNichols (2002), 
Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki (2006).  
 
70272                               Susana Callao et al. A comparative study on earnings management by eastern and western european companies 
Managers may settle for less competitive expectations to make 
them more easily achieved, as can be observed for the 
European companies. Additionally, in Table 5 we compare the 
absolute value of means (the magnitude of means without 
considering its sign) of positive and negative discretionary 
accruals to evaluate the level of downwards and upwards 
manipulation in our eight European countries.  We observe 
significant differences in terms of the means between Eastern 
and Western European countries. Eastern European countries 
show a higher level of positive means over the negative means 
of discretionary accruals (upwards manipulations are higher 
than the downwards manipulation), which may indicate that 
managers of our four Eastern samples countries are more likely 
to round down their results slightly. On the other hand, 
Western European countries have a significantly higher level 
of negative means over the positive. This indicates that 
managers manage earnings to decrease them, and they do it 
significantly. Eastern and Western European countries differ 
significantly in terms of history, culture, or economy. This 
different heritage may have an influence on managers’ way of 







































On the one side Western European countries were marked by 
capitalism, and the long process of development of their 
market-oriented economies. They reached stability and solidity 
in running their business. On the other hand, Eastern European 
companies were influenced for many years by communism. 
They have just started to adapt to the Western democratic and 
economical system through their recent incorporation to the 
European Union and collapse of their centrally-planned 
economies. Finally, our results confirm that companies from 
Western European countries decrease earnings more 
aggressively than the companies from emerging Eastern 
European countries. Western European companies are well 
established on the European market. They have more 
information. They are characterized by stability and maturity.  
 
Kruskal wallis non-parametric test: We run the Kruskal 
Wallis non-parametric test using the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals to rank and compare the European 
countries in terms of the earnings management over our 
sample period. The results are presented in Table 6. Obtained 
results reveal a statistically significant difference in earnings 
management between different European countries every year.   
Mean ranks of each year indicate that we observe lower 
manipulation in Western European countries. We may observe 
the lowest manipulation in France, with the exception of 2008, 
where the companies from UK and Spain show a lower rank 







































Additionally, from the Western European countries, companies 
from Germany show the closest level of manipulation to the 
Eastern European countries. Over all years German companies 
present the highest manipulation within the Western European 
countries. Nevertheless, it is still significantly below the 
Eastern European companies. Finally, companies form Eastern  
 
                                                           Source: Based on the study of Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski, 2014b.  
 
Figure 1. Number of studies on European countries 
 
 
* It has been investigated a total of 207 papers. There are 14 descriptive studies without  
sample country. Therefore, the statistics includes total of 193 papers.  
Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski, 2014b. 
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Table 1. Studies on earnings management based on mutli-country samples / 
panel studies (comparative studies) 
 
Author (year) Countries Nº of companies Objective of study 
Maijoor and 
Vanstraelen (2002) 
4 countries: France, UK, the 
Netherlands and Germany 
The total  
number of firm year observations 
is 17,838   
(France: 3,904 Germany: 3,992; 
the  
Netherlands: 1,244;  
UK: 8,698). 
They studied earnings management 
in an international context. More 
specifically, they presented the 
effects of three factors on earnings 
management: the national audit 
environment, audit firm quality and 
reliance on international capital 
markets. 
Coppens and Peek 
(2005) 
8 countries: 
Belgium, Denmark,  
France, Germany, Italy,  
the Netherlands, Spain,  
United Kingdom 
77,124 firm-year observations The authors addressed the questions 
of whether private firms in eight 
European countries engage in 
earnings management, and if so, 
whether tax incentives affect such 
practices. 
Burgstahler, Hail and 
Leuz (2006) 
13 countries:  
Austria, Belgium,  
Denmark, Finland,  
France, Germany,  
Greece, Italy,  
Netherlands, Portugal,  
Spain, Sweden,  
United Kingdom 
287,354 firm-year observations 
 
The study examined how capital 
market pressures and institutional 
structures shape firms’ incentives to 
report earnings that properly reflect 
their economic performance. 
 
Maijoor and  
Vanstraelen (2006) 
France, Germany and UK 17,394 companies 
(France 3,904 Germany 4,067;  
UK: 9,423) 
The study examined earnings 
management studying three factors: 
member state audit environment, 
audit firm quality and presence in 
international capital markets. 
Drautz (2007) Germany and UK The final data sample consists of  
175 observations  including 63 
German  IPOs and 112 UK IPOs. 
The authors concentrated on the 
question of whether earnings 
management is a function of the 
national audit environment and other 
factors influencing earnings quality.   
Aussenegg, Inwinkl 
and Schneider (2008) 
17 countries: 
Austria, Belgium,  
Denmark, France,  
Finland, Germany,  
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands,  
Portugal, Spain, Sweden,  
United Kingdom 
18,896  
firm-year observations  
 
The study examined how the 
transition from local GAAPs to 
IAS/IFRS of companies that are 
publicly traded on a European stock 
exchange affects earnings 
management. 
 
Ittonen, Peni and 
Vähämaa (2009) 
Finland and Sweden Using a sample of 371 Finnish 
and Swedish listed firms. 
They examined the association 
between earnings management and 
the gender of the audit engagement 
partner.  
 
Callao and Jarne 
(2010)  
 
11 countries:  
Belgium, Finland,  
France, Germany,  
Greece, Italy,  
Netherlands, Portugal,  
Spain, Sweden,  
United Kingdom. 
1,408 firms (5,632 observations) The authors focused on the effect of 
IFRS on earnings management. 
Dilger and Graschitz 
(2015)  
Germany and Austria The total of 245 company years The paper aimed at empirically 
showing which factors affect 
earnings management. In general, 
analyses showed that the distribution 
in earnings management intervals 
differ from the total population. 
Most noteworthy is that by adoption 
of principle-based accounting 
standards (IFRS/US-GAAP), in case 
of this study no differences of 
earnings quality was observable.  
Hooghiemstra, 
Hermes, Oxelheim 
and Trond (2015) 
Denmark, Finland, Norway or 
Sweden 
A total of 3,249 firm-year 
observations (comprising 668 
firm-year observations for 
Denmark, 685 for Finland, 480 
for Norway and 1,416 for 
Sweden) 
The paper examined the effects of 
the presence of a foreign board 
member on earnings management. It 
is found that the presence of a non-
Nordic, foreign director is associated 
with significantly higher levels of 
earnings management. 
 
        Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski, 2014a and the Author.  
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  Table 2: Studies on earnings management based on the sample from developing Eastern European countries 
 
Author (year) Country No. of companies Objective of the study 
Kamela-Sowinska 
(2003) 
Poland Based on the one 
company  
Description of the case of Enron.  
Prusak (2003) Poland Theoretical 
research 
Treating the problem of the distortion of financial statements. 
Explaining the situation of the occurrence of accounting scandals. 






Treating the topic of creative accounting. 
Wiercińska (2008) Poland  Theoretical 
research 
The issue of terminology connected with accounting frauds, 
which were committed by famous companies such as Enron, 
Worldcom etc., is brought up in the article.  The author tries to 
explain the main differences between such terms as creative, 
aggressive and fraudulent accounting, which are often wrongly, 
and interchangeably used. 
Tokarski (2009) Poland Theoretical 
research – 
mentioned the wide 
range of companies 
which use creative 
accounting 
Balance policy is not only the art of making what is possible, but 
also the art of making it according to the law. Examples of these 
occurrences are known as: creative accounting, window dressing, 
incomes smoothing, or off balance sheet financing. The aim of the 
article is to show that financial statements can be an imperfect 
source of information about the financial situation of the 
enterprise and possible the negative consequences for potential 
users.  
Gierusz (2010) Poland Theoretical 
research 
The bankruptcy of Enron in December 2001, which shook the 
American economy and world public opinion, marked the 
beginning of a fierce discussion on the creative accounting. The 
purpose of this article is to attempt to define these issues. 
Jackowicz and 
Kozłowski (2010) 
Poland  382 banks from 11 
different countries 
The article examines the importance of thresholds of profitability 
in the operation of commercial banks originating from the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The authors assume that 
the threshold is important, when banks take management actions. 
The results of these actions are characteristic discontinuities in 
distributions profitability measures around the threshold.  
Wojtowicz (2010) Poland Theoretical 
research 
This monograph is an attempt at a comprehensive look at the 
issue of the phenomenon known in the English-language literature 
as earnings management. The study presents the terminology on 
earnings management. In this paper the author proposes that 
earnings management be translated into Polish as "shaping the 
financial result." 
Wojtowicz (2015) Poland Sample comprises 
609 observations 
The aim of the paper is to detect any signals of earnings 
management to achieve zero or small positive earnings surprises. 
Results are not sensitive to the choice of earnings surprise metric. 
Callao, Jarne and 
Wroblewski (2017a) 





The total  
number of firm 
year observations is 






This paper provides evidence in terms of the incentives which 
lead managers from emerging European countries to manage 
earnings. Within the different incentives which lead managers to 
earnings management, the avoidance of debt covenants violations 
is a strong incentive for managers. Additionally, those firms 
considered as poor investments have incentives to manage 
earnings down as a consequence to opt for market niche. 
Moreover, emerging Eastern European companies have incentives 
to flatten earnings of current periods in order to benefit in the 
future. Finally, it is confirmed that privately-owned companies 
tend to maximize accounting earnings more than state-owned 
companies because they are in a weaker position related to a 
specific political and historical factors. 
Callao, Jarne and 
Wroblewski (2017b) 





The total  
number of firm 
year observations is 






They investigate earnings management in unlisted firms across 
four emerging Eastern European countries. The results show that 
an average firm from emerging Eastern European countries 
manages earnings downwards. Results suggest that the 
manipulation varies over the years: a decrease in earnings 
management between 2003 and 2007, and increase in earnings 
manipulation between 2008 and 2009. It is also confirmed that 
there is a significant difference in earnings management between 
the emerging countries analyzed.  
Callao, Jarne and 
Wroblewski (2017c) 





The total  
number of firm 
year observations is 






The study focuses on analyses of the existent earnings 
management models to evaluate their reliability in detection 
earnings management. The results confirm that the Jones (1991), 
Shivakumar (1996), Kasznik (1999) and Yoon and Miller model 
(2002) offers the most reliable results for detecting earnings 
management in emerging Eastern European post-communism 
economic environment. Additionally, based on broad analyses the 
results indicate that there is no superiority of the cross-sectional 
models vis-à-vis their time-series counterparts. Both 
methodologies are consistent in detecting earnings management 
for Eastern European companies.  
               Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski, 2014a and the Author. 
 
























































European show higher earnings management than Western 
European companies, as mentioned. The highest manipulation 
is observed for Hungary between 2003 and 2006; and then for 
Slovakia between 2007 and 2009. According to Aussenegg, 
Inwinkl, and Schneider (2008), developing firms my exhibit 
higher levels of earnings management (more earnings 
decreasing or increasing). They investigated earnings 
management in 15 different European countries capturing 
different dimensions of earnings management. They stressed 
the point that earnings management takes place whenever firms 























































impression of the company’s image. Since developing firms 
might need to exposure the certain position that earnings 
management can be used as a response to meet certain earnings 
targets. As explained by the authors, this does not necessarily 
mean that they try to overstate their earnings on a period by 
period basis. It may also be possible that they design their 
accruals in order to smooth earnings between periods.  
 
Cluster Analysis: We perform cluster analyses. By cluster 
analysis, we look forward whether our eight European 
companies can be divided into distinct groups.  
Table 3. Sample selection 
 
Panel A: Western European samples  
  France  Germany  Spain  UK  Total 
Total number of firms available in Amadeus 
data base 
20,828 2,477 13,335 12,572 49,212 
Incomplete data (missing data) (1,316) (489) (1,132) (916) (3,853) 
Extreme values1 (456) (79) (1,532) (911) (2,978) 
Total sample firms in Western European 
countries 
19,056 1,909 10,671 10,745 42,381 
Total observations in Western European 
countries 
152,448 15,272 85,368 85,960 339,048 
 x 
Panel B: Eastern European samples  
  Czech R.  Poland  Hungary  Slovakia  Total 
Total number of firms available in Amadeus 
data base 
3,006 2,609 183 398 6,196 
Incomplete data (missing data) (779) (208) (62) (163) (1,212) 
Extreme values (178) (150) (7) (22) (357) 
Total sample firms in Eastern European 
countries 
2,049 2,251 114 213 4,627 
Total observations in Eastern European 
countries 
14,343 15,757 798 1,491 32,389 
 x 
Total sample firms in European countries 21,105 4,160 10,785 10,958 47,008 
Total observations in European countries 166,791 31,029 86,166 87,451 371,437 
 
Table 4. Results of the earnings management: positive vs. negative discretionary accruals 
 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Panel A: Czech Republic 
Zero or positive %  30.01% 36.26% 32.21% 40.95% 38.21% 27.38% 21.47% 32.36% 
Negative % 69.99% 63.74% 67.79% 59.05% 61.79% 72.62% 78.53% 67.64% 
x 
Panel B: Poland  
Zero or positive %  30.96% 39.63% 29.05% 30.83% 35.14% 24.21% 22.30% 30.30% 
Negative % 69.04% 60.37% 70.95% 69.17% 64.86% 75.79% 77.70% 69.70% 
 
Panel C: Hungary  
Zero or positive %  42.11% 28.95% 32.46% 37.72% 35.09% 23.68% 23.68% 31.95% 
Negative % 57.89% 71.05% 67.54% 62.28% 64.91% 76.32% 76.32% 68.05% 
  
Panel D: Slovakia  
Zero or positive %  22.07% 36.62% 23.47% 27.70% 23.00% 24.88% 12.21% 24.28% 
Negative % 77.93% 63.38% 76.53% 72.30% 77.00% 75.12% 87.79% 75.72% 
  
Panel E: France  
Zero or positive %  31.40% 34.91% 36.11% 36.77% 39.53% 32.66% 26.66% 34.01% 
Negative % 68.60% 65.09% 63.89% 63.23% 60.47% 67.34% 73.34% 65.99% 
 
Panel F: Germany  
Zero or positive %  14.61% 16.13% 17.23% 18.49% 19.80% 16.08% 12.57% 16.42% 
Negative % 85.39% 83.87% 82.77% 81.51% 80.20% 83.92% 87.43% 83.58% 
 
Panel G: Spain  
Zero or positive %  37.96% 40.69% 40.83% 44.08% 43.08% 33.80% 23.27% 37.67% 
Negative % 62.04% 59.31% 59.17% 55.92% 56.92% 66.20% 76.73% 62.33% 
 
Panel H: UK  
Zero or positive %  25.08% 32.21% 31.77% 33.45% 30.60% 22.04% 27.66% 28.97% 
Negative % 74.92% 67.79% 68.23% 66.55% 69.40% 77.96% 72.34% 71.03% 
 






















































Using the absolute values of discretionary accruals we perform 
cluster procedure from two different perspectives: a cluster 
analysis by year; and a cluster analysis by the combined period 
of 2003-2009. Following, we present results on cluster analysis 
to contrast our results.  
 
Cluster analysis by year: Annex 4 provides the results on 
cluster analysis by each year in a period of 2003-2009. Seven 
different clusters are performed. Each panel represents the 
results for each year. We can observe that each year’s analysis 
shows a different number of clusters. In 2008 there are 8 
groups; in 2005 and 2006 5 groups; and finally in 2003, 2004, 






















































All clusters’ average earnings management scores are 
statistically significant (all seven years). Additionally, we 
detect that all clusters over different years (no matter whether 
there are four, five, or eight clusters in each year) are closely 
parallel, containing well clustered data by countries. We can 
observe that 95% to 100% of the observations of companies 
from one country are clearly matched into the same cluster. 
Only companies from France in 2008 are separated into two 
different groups (19.6% and 78.9%), but still they are clustered 
separately from the other countries. It may confirm that 
earnings management of companies from one country remains 
significantly similar or at least comparable over time.  
 
Table 5. Summary of the means of positive and negative discretionary accruals 
 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Panel A: Czech Republic 
Mean positive 0.1091 0.1106 0.1030 0.1065 0.1049 0.0926 0.0817 0.1012 
Mean negative 0.0923 0.0958 0.0902 0.0811 0.0744 0.0883 0.0962 0.0883 
Difference 0.0169 0.0148 0.0129 0.0254 0.0305 0.0043 -0.0145 0.0129 
 
Panel B: Poland  
Mean positive 0.1026 0.1311 0.1075 0.1143 0.1110 0.0852 0.0757 0.1039 
Mean negative 0.0928 0.0959 0.0898 0.0867 0.0893 0.0892 0.0918 0.0908 
Difference 0.0098 0.0352 0.0177 0.0276 0.0216 -0.0040 -0.0161 0.0131 
 
Panel C: Hungary  
Mean positive 0.2257 0.1781 0.0989 0.1696 0.0697 0.0684 0.0751 0.1265 
Mean negative 0.0829 0.1066 0.0859 0.0704 0.0862 0.0955 0.0972 0.0892 
Difference 0.1427 0.0716 0.0131 0.0992 -0.0165 -0.0271 -0.0221 0.0373 
 
Panel D: Slovakia  
Mean positive 0.0971 0.1019 0.0590 0.1038 0.1377 0.1191 0.0896 0.1012 
Mean negative 0.0888 0.0697 0.0827 0.0804 0.1214 0.1128 0.1232 0.0970 
Difference 0.0082 0.0322 -0.0237 0.0234 0.0163 0.0064 -0.0336 0.0042 
 
Panel E: France  
Mean positive 0.0900 0.0814 0.0784 0.0786 0.0758 0.0765 0.0678 0.0784 
Mean negative 0.1505 0.1671 0.1661 0.1687 0.1968 0.1446 0.1332 0.1610 
Difference -0.0605 -0.0857 -0.0877 -0.0900 -0.1210 -0.0681 -0.0655 -0.0826 
 
Panel F: Germany  
Mean positive 0.0813 0.0754 0.0825 0.0745 0.0720 0.0610 0.0735 0.0743 
Mean negative 0.0968 0.0910 0.0970 0.0983 0.0897 0.0924 0.0928 0.0940 
Difference -0.0155 -0.0157 -0.0145 -0.0238 -0.0177 -0.0314 -0.0192 -0.0197 
 
Panel G: Spain  
Mean positive 0.1681 0.1471 0.1344 0.1272 0.1136 0.0972 0.0777 0.1236 
Mean negative 0.2024 0.2311 0.2331 0.3191 0.2910 0.1769 0.1397 0.2276 
Difference -0.0343 -0.0840 -0.0986 -0.1919 -0.1774 -0.0796 -0.0621 -0.1040 
 
Panel H: UK  
Mean positive 0.0897 0.0935 0.0857 0.0871 0.0768 0.0679 0.0796 0.0829 
Mean negative 0.1197 0.1437 0.1450 0.1506 0.1257 0.1184 0.1390 0.1346 
Difference -0.0300 -0.0502 -0.0593 -0.0635 -0.0489 -0.0505 -0.0594 -0.0517 
 
Table 6. Results on Kruskal Wallis non-parametric test on Eastern and Western European countries 
 
    Kruskal-Wallis Results 
  Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
   Chi-Square 100,813* 300,304* 289,781* 223,733* 312,960* 204,562* 169,761* 
Mean 
Rank 
Czech R. 25,724.71 26,299.51 26,731.49 26,057.75 25,037.51 25,563.39 25,570.07 
Poland 24,703.07 27,391.19 26,091.74 25,928.91 27,213.75 24,920.29 24,661.50 
Hungary 27,890.72 29,145.06 26,935.11 26,109.75 26,189.63 25,149.80 26,452.45 
Slovakia 25,976.81 25,010.22 25,356.38 26,246.44 31,483.61 29,139.46 31,346.20 
France 23,218.96 23,113.72 22,755.53 22,873.13 22,900.03 22,684.75 22,984.24 
Germany 24,262.56 23,750.33 24,833.40 25,062.76 23,764.36 23,197.54 23,861.06 
Spain 23,800.44 23,462.26 24,038.30 23,921.80 23,525.61 22,669.20 23,583.65 
UK 23,712.28 23,449.36 23,883.83 23,889.45 23,451.94 22,484.43 23,549.50 
           * significance at 1% 





































































































































                                                    Source: The author. 
 
Figure 3. Cluster analysis by year.  Dendogram of countries 
 
Table 7. Cluster analysis by year. Descriptive statistics 
 
    Clusters 
Year   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2003 
Mean 0.1304 0.0839 0.0800 0.0707 
– – – – 
Std. Deviation 0.2038 0.0845 0.0797 0.0616 
  
Czech R., Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia, 
Germany 
Spain UK France         
 
2004 
Mean 0.1190 0.0766 0.0750 0.0740 
– – – – 
Std. Deviation 0.1750 0.0737 0.0735 0.0740 
  
Czech R., Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia, 
Germany 
Spain UK France         
 
2005 
Mean 0.1784 0.0810 0.0789 0.0722 0.0670 
– – – 







UK France       
 
2006 
Mean 0.1887 0.0795 0.0782 0.0755 0.0624 
– – – 






Spain UK France       
 
2007 
Mean 0.1159 0.0701 0.0651 0.0602 
– – – – 
Std. Deviation 0.1571 0.0703 0.0548 0.0527 
  
Czech R., Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia, 
Germany, 
UK Spain France         
 
2008 
Mean 0.3249 0.1687 0.0830 0.0802 0.0702 0.0659 0.0649 0.0439 
Std. Deviation 0.3090 0.0511 0.0708 0.0684 0.0603 0.0501 0.0492 0.0304 
  
Hungary, Slovakia 
France (19% of 
extreme results)  
Czech R. Poland Germany Spain UK France 
 
2009 
Mean 0.0977 0.0852 0.0760 0.0729 
– – – – 
Std. Deviation 0.1170 0.0759 0.0591 0.0618 
  
Hungary, Slovakia, UK 
Czech R., Poland, 
Germany, 
Spain France         
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Figure 3 (dendogram) illustrates the connections in terms of 
the earnings management between the samples among 
different European countries. We may observe that France, 
Spain and the UK were always assigned into separate and 
individual clusters over all period years (with the exception of 
2005 where Spain was clustered together with Hungary and 
Slovakia; and in 2009 UK was clustered together with as well 
Hungary and Slovakia). It means the scope of earnings 
management in each country is different. Germany, our last 
Western European country, was always clustered with Eastern 
European countries (only in 2008 was it clustered separately). 
In 2003, 2004 and 2007 Germany was matched with all four 
Eastern European countries; in 2006 with Poland, Hungary and 
Slovakia; in 2009 with Poland and the Czech Republic; and 
finally in 2005 with the Czech Republic. This may indicate 
that the earnings management behaviour of managers of 
Eastern European companies is most similar to that of 
managers of German companies.  
 
 We can also identify that in Eastern European countries, 
Hungary and Slovakia are always clustered together over all 
years. Poland and the Czech Republic also present similar 
behaviour, as they are jointly clustered in most of the cases. In 
2003, 2004, and in 2007 all Eastern European countries are 
grouped in the same cluster, presenting the Eastern European 
block as a one cluster. In Table 7 we present the descriptive 
statistics on each cluster. The results indicate that the highest 
manipulation is observed in Eastern European countries over 
years, in particular in Slovakia and Hungary. On the other 
hand, the lowest earnings management occurs in France, 
followed by the UK, and then Spain4.Therefore, the cluster 
analyses confirmed our previously obtained results from the 
Kruskal Wallis test.  
 
Cluster analysis by combined period of 2003-2009: In 
Annex 5 we perform a cluster analysis for the combined period 
of 2003-2009. The analysis shows the number of companies in 
each group to correspond percentage in total of companies 
from each country. The results are significant. We identify five 
different clusters. Again results of earnings management of the 
companies from one country were clustered in the same cluster 
with high percentage of 99% to even 100%. This result 
confirms previous analysis. The Czech Republic, Poland and 
Germany are assigned in the same cluster; with Hungary and 
Slovakia in another one. On the other hand, Spain, France and 
the UK are in separate, individual clusters, see also 
dendogram, Figure 4. Finally, in Table 8 there are presented 
the descriptive statistics of the cluster. We confirm the 
previous results. Higher levels of manipulation are observed in 
Eastern European countries, in particular in Slovakia and 
                                                 
4 Within the particularities of the results of the means, we observe that French 
companies are divided in two clusters in 2008, both separately from the other 
countries. One cluster contains most of the companies, having low mean of 
earnings management (0.04). The other cluster encloses a small number of 
companies with the extreme results of earnings management (the mean is 0.16, 
where the average mean of French companies is at 0.6–0.7 level). This is 
easily explained as the low number of companies with very high earnings 
management results compensates the other cluster containing 80% of the 
companies, having the mean below the average. Hence, France remains as the 
country showing the lowest scope of manipulation over time. Another 
singularity of the results may be observed in 2005. In this particular year 
Poland is clustered separately from the other Eastern European countries. It is 
for the first time, showing the highest mean of the earnings management (odd 
results). In the same year, Spanish companies are clustered together with 
Hungary and Slovakia, as a result, lowering the general mean of this cluster. 
The rest of the results are consistent and clear.   
 
Hungary; followed by the cluster of Czech Republic, Poland 
and Germany. The lowest earnings management is seen in 
France, followed by the UK, and then Spain5. Therefore, our 
results confirm that Eastern European countries, to a certain 
extent, follow the activity of German managers in the way of 
earnings management. In almost all clusters’ analyses, Eastern 
European countries came up in the same cluster with German 
companies. It may demonstrate a certain similarity and 
proximity of German companies and Eastern European 
countries. This situation may come from different reasons.  
First, the heritage of Eastern European accounting has its 
origin in German accounting tradition. Accounting in Eastern 
Europe has many similarities with that in Germany. In the 
absence of sophisticated equity capital markets, there was an 
emphasis on creditor protection and tax collection, and a 
preference for national charts of accounts, mainly based on the 
pioneering work of Schmalenbach in Germany in the 1920s. 
Many occupied countries in Eastern and Central Europe were 
forced to adopt the German model. Business transactions were 
regulated by means of Commercial Codes based on the 
German model (see for example, Bailey, 1988; Nobes and 
Parker, 2008).  
 
Second, Eastern European countries exhibit a similarly strong 
connection between accounting and taxation as does Germany. 
Thanks to historical influence Eastern European countries 
strongly rely on the German example of tax regulations. 
Germany is an example of a European country that shows an 
important connection between accounting and taxation. The 
principle of prudence is the most important item in the German 
accounting environment. The main feature of this system is 
still the link between accounting and taxation (Haller, 1992). 
One example in the case of Germany is that this principle is 
assisted by the eligibility of the conformity principle that 
allows companies to choose a particular accounting treatment 
or policy in order to choose a particular tax treatment (Haller, 
1992). Third, Germany and Eastern European countries present 
the same legal tradition (civil-law). The French and Spanish 
legal traditions are also derived from civil-law. Nevertheless, 
some authors distinguish different groups within civil-law. 
They show at least two more groups: French civil-law and 
German civil-law (World Bank, 2004). Therefore, we may 
explain that despite the fact that all three countries belong to 
the civil-law tradition we find differences between them, and 
in consequence, Eastern European countries show more 
similarities to Germany than to France or Spain’s legal 
traditions. La Porta et al. (1997); Ball, Kothari and Robin 
(2000); and Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) point out that a 
similar scope of earnings management may be expected 
between countries from the same legal tradition. Another 
possible reason for the close correspondence between German 
managers’ activities and Eastern European countries may be 
the similar culture. As Arora and Fosturi (2000) point out, 
national culture has long been recognized as important in 
explaining behaviour. Aspects of national culture have been 
related to many areas of organizational behaviour such as 
foreign investment decisions, entry mode decisions (Arora and  
                                                 
5 We also have performed cluster analyses using positive or negative values of 
the discretionary accruals of each company, using both procedures: cluster 
analysis by each year; and cluster analysis by the combined period of 2003-
2009. The results show similar conclusions. 
Additionally, we also have performed cluster analyses by fixed number of 
clusters (three and two clusters) using as well: cluster analysis by each year; 
and cluster analysis by the combined period of 2003-2009. The results show 
similar conclusions.    
 





































































































































                                                Source: The author. 
 
Figure 4. Cluster analysis by combined period of 2003-2009 
 
Table 8. Cluster analysis by combined period of 2003-2009 Descriptive statistics 
 
 2003-2009 Cluster 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 0.1193 0.0857 0.0794 0.0755 0.0671 
Std. Deviation 0.1068 0.0849 0.0756 0.0744 0.0629 
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Table 9. Descriptive statistics of cluster analysis of discretionary  
accruals by year within two fixed clusters 
 
    Clusters 
Year   1 2 
2003 
Mean 0.1100 0.0805 
Std. Deviation 0.2834 0.0863 
  
Czech R., Poland,  
Hungary, Slovakia,  
Germany,  Spain 
France,         
UK 
 
    Clusters 
Year   1 2 
2004 
Mean 0.1044 0.0772 
Std. Deviation 0.1830 0.0840 
  
Czech R.,  






   
2005 
Mean 0.0904 0.0724 
Std. Deviation 0.1290 0.0775 
  
Czech R.,  
Poland,  
Hungary, Slovakia,  
Germany, Spain,  
UK 
France 
   
2006 
Mean 0.0954 0.0733 
Std. Deviation 0.1445 0.0784 
  
Czech R.,  
Poland,  




   
2007 
Mean 0.0831 0.0696 
Std. Deviation 0.1172 0.0770 
  
Czech R.,  
Poland, Hungary,  
Slovakia,  





Mean 0.0815 0.0814 
Std. Deviation 0.0959 0.0790 
  
Hungary,  
Slovakia, Spain,  
France 
Czech R.,  
Poland,  
Germany,                
UK 
 
    Clusters 
Year   1 2 
2009 
Mean 0.0908 0.0766 
Std. Deviation 0.0977 0.0697 
  
Czech R.,  
Poland, Hungary,  






Table 10. Descriptive statistics of cluster analysis of discretionary accruals over combined  
period of 2003 -2009 within two fixed clusters 
 
    Clusters 
Period   1 2 
2003-2009 
Mean 0.0997 0.0745 
Std. Deviation 0.1717 0.0744 
  






France,     
UK 
 










































Fosturi, 2000), research and development decisions 
(Muralidharan and Phatak, 1999) and negotiation behaviour 
(Leung, 1988), among others. Germ any, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia6 are classified as Central 
European countries (see, for example, Pehe, 2002; Armstrong 
and Anderson, 2007) characterized by a similar culture. It may 
explain the similar behaviour as regards to earnings 
management between managers of Eastern European countries 
and Germany. Finally, we think that simple geographical 
situation and the proximity of Germany and Eastern European 
countries can additionally explain this cluster association. 
Managers of Eastern European countries could have taken an 
example from their neighbour country. Despite the similarities 
between Germany and Eastern European countries we also find 
significant differences between Eastern European countries 
and other three our Western European sample countries: 
France, Spain and UK. Therefore, to be able to explain such 
differences, we perform additional cluster analyses. We 
specify fixed number of clusters, as in prior clusters’ analyses 
the number of clusters was determined automatically. In 
consequence, previously we have observed how companies 
within different countries were grouped in different clusters 
and in different numbers of clusters.  
                                                 









































Previous cluster analysis has always distributed France, Spain 
and UK in separate clusters. Now, we are interested in whether 
specifying a limited low number of clusters helps to regroup 
these three countries France, Spain and UK with some Eastern 
European countries, or at least clusters them together.  In 
consequence, we perform cluster analysis into the fixed 
number of two clusters. As previously, we perform cluster 
analysis using two different procedures: cluster analysis by 
each year; and cluster analysis by the combined period of 
2003-2009. We use absolute values of discretionary accruals 
(the same procedure as previously; using the absolute values 
we avoid the compensation effect of negative and positive 
values of discretionary accruals, in the previous section we 
evaluated the effect of sign of discretionary accruals).  
 
Cluster analyses within two fixed clusters: Annex 6 provides 
the results for cluster analysis by year; and Annex 7 provides 
the results for the combined period of 2003-2009. 
Additionally, Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate the clusters. The 
results show that Spain is clustered with Germany and Eastern 
European countries (with the exception of 2008). On the other 
hand, France and the UK are clustered together in a separate 
cluster. In 2005, 2007 and 2009 France is grouped individually 
and the UK joined the other six countries.  Finally, descriptive 
statistics for two fixed clusters confirm, as expected, the 
Table 11. Friedman non-parametric test: results 
 
Panel A: Eastern European countries. 
 
  Czech Republic Poland Hungary Slovakia 
Chi-Square  77.251** 87.184** 15.534* 61.087** 
 2003 4.07 3.85 4.35 3.73 
 2004 4.13 4.34 4.38 3.57 
 2005 4.12 4.02 3.99 3.57 
Mean  2006 3.89 3.91 3.8 3.66 
Rank 2007 3.66 4.06 3.54 4.48 
 2008 4.00 3.83 3.74 4.33 
 2009 4.13 3.98 4.21 4.66 
 
Panel B: Western European countries 
 
  France Germany Spain UK 
Chi-Square  534.861** 84.036** 323.050* 272.000** 
 2003 4.16 4.11 4.08 4.10 
 2004 4.05 3.95 3.97 3.97 
 2005 3.92 4.11 3.96 4.00 
Mean  2006 3.87 4.12 3.84 3.92 
Rank 2007 3.80 3.66 3.83 3.75 
 2008 4.01 3.87 4.06 4.09 
 2009 4.19 4.18 4.26 4.17 
                                   * significance at 5%** significance at 1% 
 
Figure 8. Tendencies of earnings management in the European countries over the years. 
 
 
                  Source: The author.  
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significantly lower level of discretionary accruals in the cluster 
of French and UK companies in comparison to the Eastern 
European, German and Spanish companies, see Table 9 and 
Table 10.  Therefore, based on the detailed cluster analyses we 
have confirmed the heterogeneity observed in Western 
European countries, indeed, France and the UK show different 
earnings management behaviour than any other.  One possible 
explanation of heterogeneity in earnings management between 
France, the UK and other our sample countries (Eastern and 
Western European countries) may come from the existent 
differences within national audit environments. Maijoor and 
Vanstraelen (2002) explain that national audit environments 
vary strongly among different European countries in terms of 
independence rules, auditor education and auditor liability. 
Hence, it can be expected that the restrictions imposed by 
national audit environments on earnings management may 
vary. Their results confirm that France is the country that has 
the highest number of laws and regulations intended to 
improve audit quality. In particular, France imposes 
restrictions on the minimal length of the audit mandate. 
Moreover, management advisory services and advertising are 
not allowed. Statutory auditors are subject to reviews by peers 
and regulators. The UK is classified as the country with the 
second strictest audit quality regime due to the high risk of 
litigation. On the other hand, Germany shows more flexible 
audit quality regimes (Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2002). In 
particular, the results suggest that companies in countries with 
flexible audit quality regimes (Germany, or Spain7 and other 
Eastern European countries that as mentioned follow the 
example of Germany) report significantly higher absolute 
values of discretionary accruals compared to companies in 
countries with strict audit quality regimes (France and the UK) 
(Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2002, 2006).  
 
These results help us to understand why France and the UK are 
always clustered separately (in different groups than Germany 
or Spain, and other Eastern European countries). The strict and 
low flexibility of audits significantly affects managers’ 
decisions in terms of earnings management, and in effect 
creates differences among the European countries. 
Additionally, we have previously confirmed that the UK and 
France show the lowest level of earnings management8. This is 
in accordance with the results presented by Maijoor and 
Vanstraelen (2002), as strong audit quality limits the scope of 
earnings management.  Another possible reason may come 
from the different institutional environments in each of our 
Western European countries. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) 
build an aggregate earnings management measure, and 
compare it across a comprehensive sample of countries, 
including the UK, France, Spain and Germany. They found 
that earnings management practices differ significantly across 
countries, and that the divergences are linked to the different 
institutional environments in each country. Their evidence 
suggests that countries with a less dispersed ownership 
structure and weak investor rights (e.g. Germany) engage more 
in earnings management, even if there is strong legal 
enforcement. They argue explicitly that earnings management 
is more pervasive in countries where the legal protection of 
outside investors is weak, because in these countries insiders 
enjoy greater private control benefits and hence have stronger 
incentives to obfuscate firm performance (Leuz, Nanda, and 
Wysocki, 2003). Hence, we may explain why France and the 
                                                 
7 See for details, Spanish audit quality was analysed by García-Benau et al. 
(2004).  
8 see Kruskal-Wallis test. 
UK are not clustered with Germany and other Eastern 
European countries.  At the same time, the possible similarity 
between Spain and Eastern European countries may be as a 
result of similar process of transformation of Eastern 
European countries’ economies to the Spanish one. When we 
turn our attention to the 13 (mostly) Eastern European 
countries that have either recently joined the EU, or are in line 
to join, we may notice that Poland, for example, is the most 
similar to Spain in terms of labour productivity, geographical 
similarities, agricultural resemblance, inflation rate at that 
time, unemployment rate, interest rate, etc (at the time of EU 
ascension). Some authors even called Poland a New Spain. 
Caselli and Tenreyro (2005) ask: “Is Poland the Next Spain?”. 
In this sense, Poland and other Eastern European countries 
may have some similarities with Spain, explaining the 
observed cluster association.  
 
Kaitila (2010) explains that this similarity may exist in terms 
of the quality of European Union countries’ export structure. 
He analyses the EU27 countries’ export structures in the period 
of 1999 to 2008. He observes clear similarity indicators by 
pairs of countries indicating that between 1999 and 2008 the 
strongest quality-adjusted similarity exists between Germany–
Austria, Netherlands–Belgium, Sweden–Austria, Spain–
Poland (our sample countries), Poland–Czech Republic (our 
sample countries), and Romania–Bulgaria. In this sense, we 
find similarities between Spain and Eastern European 
countries, as over the years, all five countries attempted to 
avoid the situation of being placed in the periphery of the 
continent and having to face challenges alone.  
 
Friedman test. time-line analysis: Table 11 presents the 
results of the Friedman tests. The results obtained suggest that 
earnings management does vary over time for Eastern as well 
as for Western European countries. The test shows the 
significance of the results (Chi-Square mostly significant at 
1%) and verifies that there are differences in manipulation over 
the years in Eastern and Western European countries. Figure 7 
shows the evolution of the mean ranks of each country. 
Therefore, we observe fluctuations in earnings management, 
and inconstant manipulation for Eastern as well as for Western 
European countries over our study period. The scope of the 
manipulation has been changing over time reflecting the 
general situation of the European market, as we observe 
important economic fluctuations in our period. First of all, the 
effect of the process of enlargement of the European Union 
took place during the period of study. The incorporation of 
new countries into to the EU has influenced the increment of 
European competition. It has also stimulated free business 
negotiations, and the flow of capital, among others factors.  
Additionally, the world financial crisis entails more than a 
systemic impact on aggregate macro variables. It leads to the 
re-composition of the microeconomic structure, which in turn 
shapes the response of the economy to the crisis. In crisis 
situations firms and sectors must readapt their capabilities, 
learning processes and production and investment strategies.  
Managers from both markets, Eastern and Western, tried to 
cope with these situations, fulfilment of expectations of their 
owners to reach targets, and others aspects, by earnings 
management. They were not able to predict economic 
tendencies, so in effect they were modifying their activities, in 
terms of earnings management, as we may observe on the 
graphic. Managers of European companies have been 
responding to these fluctuations by earnings management. 
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Based on the Friedman test ranks, we detect two main 
tendencies: firstly, a decrease in manipulation between 
2003/2004 and 2007. Our countries’ mean ranks gradually 
reduced manipulation. All our Western European countries 
reduced manipulation starting from 2003 and Eastern 
European countries from 20049, see Figure 8.  
 
We also detect a second trend. Between 2008 and 2009 we 
observe increases in manipulation for all Eastern, as well as, 
Western European countries10. The first tendency of reducing 
the scope of earnings management11 (2003-2007) can be 
explained by the effect of the collapse of Enron Corporation, 
WorldCom and other financial scandals in late 2001. Different 
authors have explained, see for example Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2001), Manne (2002), Sosnoff (2002), Niskanen 
(2004), these bankruptcies of big companies reflected the 
general weakness of markets and the possibility of earnings 
manipulation by the managers of the companies. The 
revelation of gross accounting violations by these and other 
firms and the continued weakness of the financial markets 
have undermined both popular and political support for free-
market policies. This effect has already led to the increased 
regulation of accounting and auditing authorized by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (see Manne, 2002; Sosnoff, 2002; 
Niskanen, 2004). Increment control of financial statements was 
introduced in the following years around the world to prevent 
other such financial collapses. Therefore, strengthening the 
control may have reduced earnings management in European 
countries in the first years of our analysis period.  
 
In addition, the process of enlargement of the European Union 
by incorporating new members into the global and European 
market had impact not only on the new incorporated countries, 
but also had an influence on the former members (in other 
words, Western European countries), resulting in strengthened 
competition in the European market. Managers reduced 
manipulation in response to the necessity of the transparency 
in terms of the possible acquisition of potential investors. 
Moreover, the macroeconomic conditions of the new comers 
of the European market and the older participants could also 
have an important impact on the decline in earnings 
management between 2003 and 2007. As pointed out by 
Clayton and Giesbrecht (1997) and Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 
(2003) the macroeconomic performance of the countries is an 
institutional factor that has been analyzed by authors in 
relation to earnings management. It leads to an open, global 
and boundary-less market, which helped economic 
development (see, for example, Czinkota and Ronkainen, 
1997; Alon and Welsh, 2002). Both parts of Europe took 
advantage of the opportunity of making business without 
frontiers. Therefore, more possibilities for the companies have 
been reflected in lower levels of discretionary accruals.  
However, in the last two years (2008-2009), we have already 
observed the effect of the global financial crisis. Managers of 
the European countries (both markets) perceived a lack of 
resources or at least fewer resources, stronger competition, and 
in effect the level of earnings management rose. As pointed 
out, in bad economic situations it is harder to achieve 
previously established targets. Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman 
(2002) and Cohen and Zarowin (2007) describe that during 
periods of crisis, managers manipulate earnings more (to 
                                                 
9 Slovakia companies showed this tendency between 2003 and 2006.  
10 For Slovakia we even observed it, one year before, in a period of 2007–
2009.  
11 less decreasing earnings  
decrease or increase) to fulfil their companies’ objectives. 
Managers of European companies were not able to follow the 
previously matched objectives and they may have opted for 
more earnings decreasing to be able to fulfil future targets.   
 
 Conclusion 
    
The study draws a comparative study between Eastern and 
Western European countries on earnings management practice. 
This is a first study which evaluates and compares earnings 
management between Eastern and Western European 
countries. We compared four well-developed markets of 
Western European countries: Germany, France, Spain and the 
UK, with emerging markets from the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary and Slovakia, as developing Eastern European 
markets increasingly gain importance in the European 
panorama. No longer can Europe be designate only by Western 
part. The results indicate that companies in the European 
countries included in the study, engage in earnings 
management, in particular in decreasing earnings practices. 
Around 70% of the companies from Eastern and Western 
European countries manage earnings to downward. Literature 
points out those managers may decrease earnings to meet 
bonus targets (Healy, 1985); to protect their job (Fudenberg 
and Tirole, 1995; Arya, Glover and Sunder, 2003); attempt to 
control fluctuations in reported earnings and steer them to 
levels they consider desirable (Tokuga and Sakai, 2011); to opt 
for “hiding” some of their earnings (decreasing earnings) for 
reporting in a future period when earnings are lower and the 
marginal impact of a higher report is greater (Ronen and 
Sadan, 1981; Lambert, 1984); decreasing earnings is 
additionally employed to assure investors of a steady earnings 
flow (George and Furstenberg, 2006), among other reasons.  
Nevertheless, we detect important differences in earnings 
management between Eastern and Western European 
countries. The magnitude of earnings management is not 
uniform across the four countries. Mean ranks from the 
Kruskal Wallis test indicate lower manipulation in Western 
European countries than in Eastern European countries. The 
lowest manipulation was observed in France, followed by the 
UK, Spain, and Germany. The highest manipulation is 
observed in Eastern European countries, particularly in 
Hungarian and Slovakian companies.  Eastern and Western 
European countries differ significantly in terms of history, 
culture, or economy. This different heritage may have an 
influence on managers’ way of manipulating earnings. On the 
one side Western European countries were marked by 
capitalism, and the long process of development of their 
market-oriented economies. They reached stability and solidity 
in running their business. On the other hand, Eastern European 
companies were influenced for many years by communism. 
They have just started to adapt to the Western democratic and 
economical system through their recent incorporation to the 
European Union and collapse of their centrally-planned 
economies.  
Additionally, the cluster analyses confirmed significantly 
different earnings manipulation between France, Spain, the UK 
and the Eastern European countries and Germany. However, in 
the heterogeneity of the European countries we perceived that 
Eastern European countries, to a certain extent, have 
assimilated the German companies’ way of managing earnings, 
as cluster analyses confirmed that Eastern European countries 
came up in the same cluster as German companies. This may 
be explained by the similar connection between accounting and 
taxation. Eastern European countries due to historical influence 
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strongly rely on the German example of principles accounting 
as well tax regulations. In addition, historical heritage, cultural 
and geographical proximity are other possible explanations of 
the proximity of Eastern European and German companies.  
Finally, time-line analysis revealed that earnings management 
does vary in time and in extent for Eastern as well as for 
Western European countries. Moreover, we conclude that there 
is a difference in manipulation over the years in Eastern and 
Western European countries. The scope of the manipulation 
has been changing over time reflecting the general situation of 
the European market (European Union membership of Eastern 
European countries, impact of world financial crisis, etc).  
 
Nevertheless, we detect two main tendencies: firstly, a 
decrease in manipulation between 2003/2004 and 2007. Our 
countries’ mean ranks gradually reduced manipulation. All our 
Western European countries reduced manipulation starting 
from 2003 and Eastern European countries from 2004. We also 
detect a second trend: between 2008 and 2009 we observe 
increases in manipulation for all Eastern, as well as, Western 
European countries. Our results can be explained by the effect 
of the economic crisis, and the entry into the European Union 
by new countries (Eastern European countries), which caused 
the intensification of competition in Europe. Our findings 
contribute to the investigation of earnings management, as it is 
a first study comparing Western and Eastern European 
countries in terms of earnings management. The comparative 
analyses help to understand the behaviour in terms of earnings 
management both markets: Western and Eastern. It reveals 
characteristics of both parts of Europe. Although we have 
filled in some gaps in our knowledge, other issues are still 
pending. Further research is needed to focus on the possible 
comparison of motivation for earnings manipulation for 
Eastern and Western European countries, as the issue of 
earnings management in Europe as a whole has so far 
remained unanswered. Future studies could also incorporate 
some other developing countries, or compare the results with 
US or Asian studies, as we may observe important number of 
studies from these markets. Lastly, future research could be 
carried out based on consolidated financial statement of only 
listed companies to compare the results with those obtained for 
separate financial statements. Moreover, it would allow us to 
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Annex 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample of Eastern and Western European countries 
 
  Scrutiny period 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Panel A: France  
Total assets  
Mean 107,885 107,308 116,620 129,400 138,081 147,700 159,568 161,118 
Std. dev. 1,818,366 1,765,974 1,925,448 2,153,748 2,205,487 2,279,842 2,630,288 2,834,075 
Median 8,002 8,439 9,066 9,796 10,644 11,712 12,217 11,756 
Revenues  
Mean 106,147 105,962 110,781 118,486 127,784 135,837 143,209 130,746 
Std. dev. 1,460,014 1,413,930 1,431,851 1,541,075 1,666,179 1,737,711 1,914,264 1,672,578 
Median 14,598 15,322 16,417 17,399 18,778 20,301 21,304 19,887 
 
Panel B: Germany   
Total assets  
Mean 800,554 809,872 826,194 893,104 935,597 933,107 983,745 996,406 
Std. dev. 7,191,242 7,252,332 7,311,272 7,926,407 8,212,257 7,412,089 8,004,646 8,094,755 
Median 71,139 71,857 73,088 76,795 81,336 84,718 86,751 88,349 
Revenues 
Mean 685,932 690,213 715,782 758,712 796,995 838,025 889,771 820,067 
Std. dev. 5,312,467 5,112,345 5,254,376 5,528,556 5,221,611 5,483,506 5,875,185 5,513,595 
Median 69,979 72,427 75,727 79,114 84,856 86,491 91,205 84,152 
 
Panel C: Spain  
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Total assets 
Mean 74,512 79,557 87,119 100,525 119,792 136,669 142,215 144,197 
Std. dev. 941,059 915,284 956,297 1,111,817 1,403,212 1,609,645 1,679,937 1,767,905 
Median 11,203 12,688 14,464 16,444 18,928 21,109 21,786 21,166 
Revenues 
Mean 64,812 69,786 77,197 87,580 99,649 108,115 109,000 97,230 
Std. dev. 578,109 598,890 661,134 788,382 925,674 969,872 1,038,806 937,422 
Median 13,334 14,679 16,203 17,747 19,601 21,473 20,607 17,895 
 
Panel D: UK   
Total assets 
Mean 261,149 258,860 268,937 297,565 317,207 323,135 299,001 310,584 
Std. dev. 3,033,038 2,878,022 2,771,836 2,928,540 2,818,706 2,861,634 2,921,747 3,095,246 
Median 24,027 23,663 25,564 27,702 30,296 30,734 26,260 25,957 
Revenues  
Mean 220,224 224,966 244,694 265,160 288,894 279,612 270,316 257,667 
Std. dev. 2,049,623 2,156,010 2,456,726 2,518,801 2,571,346 2,490,870 3,107,349 2,593,854 
Median 32,527 33,169 35,774 37,835 41,315 41,240 34,584 32,607 
 
  Scrutiny period 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Panel E: Czech Republic 
Total assets 
Mean 12,187 12,628 14,238 15,894 17,845 20,255 21,004 20,610 
Std. dev. 21,648 20,998 22,967 25,013 27,357 31,345 32,553 31,707 
Median 5,328 5,590 6,486 7,378 8,563 9,656 9,892 9,659 
Revenues  
Mean 14,751 15,578 19,139 21,594 24,953 28,913 28,705 25,666 
Std. dev. 22,206 22,421 27,426 31,580 35,846 42,577 41,514 38,461 
Median 7,782 8,283 9,858 10,841 13,103 14,898 14,857 13,068 
Panel F: Poland  
Total assets 
Mean 12,995 12,128 15,010 17,228 19,321 22,989 21,835 22,388 
Std. dev. 20,468 18,356 22,117 25,203 27,943 32,791 31,621 33,311 
Median 5,633 5,365 6,923 8,104 9,276 11,829 11,268 11,570 
Revenues  
Mean 14,844 14,421 19,117 21,033 23,678 29,290 27,541 27,317 
Std. dev. 18,735 18,280 24,518 25,700 28,645 35,420 33,052 32,621 
Median 8,776 8,402 11,062 12,408 13,767 17,131 16,222 15,970 
Panel G: Hungary  
Total assets 
Mean 11,481 12,010 13,353 13,895 15,690 16,980 16,516 16,760 
Std. dev. 14,077 16,498 16,542 18,410 20,037 21,212 20,137 23,458 
Median 6,352 6,466 7,379 8,073 8,645 9,192 9,548 9,575 
Revenues  
Mean 20,786 20,828 22,433 23,377 26,856 29,033 28,984 24,997 
Std. dev. 30,105 29,447 24,209 27,818 29,954 30,589 27,537 22,446 
Median 11,497 11,814 14,507 15,418 17,423 19,518 20,422 18,616 
Panel H: Slovakia  
Total assets 
Mean 7,997 8,302 9,579 10,713 12,614 13,865 16,339 11,857 
Std. dev. 7,690 7,649 9,000 10,169 11,965 12,075 14,893 10,964 
Median 5,716 5,775 6,864 7,477 8,367 9,839 12,100 8,011 
Revenues  
Mean 12,259 13,200 15,037 16,745 19,922 21,972 25,561 16,233 
Std. dev. 11,831 12,414 13,801 15,287 18,257 19,845 22,446 15,323 
Median 8,282 9,209 10,383 11,457 13,669 15,353 18,800 11,661 
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Annex 2. Results on Normality test of our four samples 
 





Statistic df Sig. 
DA 
Czech R. .210 14,343 .000 
Hungary  .224 15,757 .000 
Poland  .244 798 .000 
Slovakia  .142 1,491 .000 
France  .118 133392 .000 
Germany  .127 13363 .000 
Spain  .194 79723 .000 
UK  .116 75215 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Annex 3: Statistics on the discretionary accruals of European countries. 
 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Panel A: Czech Republic 
Mean of discretionary accruals -0.0318 -0.0210 -0.0279 -0.0043 -0.0059 -0.0388 -0.0580 
Standard deviation of DA 0.1478 0.1599 0.1409 0.1389 0.1663 0.1348 0.1220 
Median of DA -0.0422 -0.0310 -0.0401 -0.0206 -0.0200 -0.0464 -0.0587 
  
Panel B: Poland  
Mean of discretionary accruals -0.0323 -0.0059 -0.0325 -0.0248 -0.0190 -0.0470 -0.0544 
Standard deviation of DA 0.1799 0.1625 0.1531 0.1760 0.1427 0.1404 0.1143 
Median of DA -0.0380 -0.0221 -0.0399 -0.0362 -0.0316 -0.0461 -0.0529 
  
Panel C: Hungary  
Mean of discretionary accruals 0.0470 -0.0242 -0.0259 0.0201 -0.0315 -0.0567 -0.0564 
Standard deviation of DA 0.3247 0.1783 0.1158 0.1905 0.1054 0.1143 0.1020 
Median of DA -0.0244 -0.0495 -0.0444 -0.0159 -0.0348 -0.0486 -0.0558 
  
Panel D: Slovakia  
Mean of discretionary accruals -0.0478 -0.0069 -0.0494 -0.0294 -0.0618 -0.0551 -0.0972 
Standard deviation of DA 0.1098 0.1113 0.0841 0.1233 0.1643 0.1477 0.1058 
Median of DA -0.0508 -0.0286 -0.0480 -0.0424 -0.0708 -0.0608 -0.0969 
 
Panel E: France  
Mean of discretionary accruals -0.0277 -0.0220 -0.0178 -0.0157 -0.0112 -0.0252 -0.0441 
Standard deviation of DA 0.1405 0.1270 0.1162 0.1175 0.1133 0.1097 0.1089 
Median of DA -0.0314 -0.0247 -0.0215 -0.0199 -0.0152 -0.0274 -0.0398 
  
Panel F: Germany   
Mean of discretionary accruals -0.0566 -0.0495 -0.0494 -0.0482 -0.0399 -0.0529 -0.0602 
Standard deviation of DA 0.0972 0.0921 0.0957 0.0918 0.0862 0.0844 0.0876 
Median of DA -0.0529 -0.0469 -0.0489 -0.0509 -0.0401 -0.0476 -0.0553 
  
Panel G: Spain  
Mean of discretionary accruals 0.0151 0.0168 0.0121 0.0183 0.0086 -0.0244 -0.0566 
Standard deviation of DA 0.3455 0.2207 0.1845 0.1679 0.1622 0.1337 0.1190 
Median of DA -0.0217 -0.0158 -0.0161 -0.0100 -0.0120 -0.0300 -0.0506 
  
Panel H: UK  
Mean of discretionary accruals -0.0372 -0.0210 -0.0256 -0.0207 -0.0253 -0.0513 -0.0401 
Standard deviation of DA 0.1172 0.1244 0.1156 0.1167 0.1035 0.1009 0.1126 
Median of DA -0.0407 -0.0283 -0.0285 -0.0247 -0.0279 -0.0455 -0.0383 
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Annex 4. Cluster analysis by year. Number of firms and the percentage of each country by cluster division 
 
Panel A: Year 2003 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 
Total % 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.0%       2,049 100% 
Poland  2,251 100.0%       2,251 100% 
Hungary  114 100.0%       114 100% 
Slovakia  213 100.0%       213 100% 
France  534 2.8%     18,522 97.2% 19,056 100% 
Germany  1,909 100.0%       1,909 100% 
Spain    10,671 100.0%     10,671 100% 
UK  26 0.2%   10,719 99.8%   10,745 100% 
  7,096  10,671  10,719  18,522  47,008  
 
Panel B: Year 2004 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 
Total % 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.0%       2,049 100% 
Poland  2,251 100.0%       2,251 100% 
Hungary  114 100.0%       114 100% 
Slovakia  213 100.0%       213 100% 
France  112 0.6%     18,944 99.4% 19,056 100% 
Germany  1,909 100.0%       1,909 100% 
Spain    10,671 100.0%     10,671 100% 
UK  116 1.1%   10,629 98.9%   10,745 100% 
  6,764  10,671  10,629  18,944  47,008  
 
Panel C: Year 2005 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 5 
Total % 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Czech R. 34 1.7% 2,015 98.3%             2,049 100% 
Poland  2,251 100.0%                 2,251 100% 
Hungary          114 100.0%         114 100% 
Slovakia          213 100.0%         213 100% 
France  300 1.6%             18,756 98.4% 19,056 100% 
Germany  3 0.2% 1,906 99.8%             1,909 100% 
Spain          10,671 100.0%         10,671 100% 
UK  209 1.9%         10,536 98.1%     10,745 100% 
  2,797   3,921   10,998   10,536   18,756   47,008   
 
Panel D: Year 2006 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 5 
Total 
%   No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.0%         2,049 100% 
Poland  32 1.4% 2,219 98.6%       2,251 100% 
Hungary  5 4.4% 109 95.6%       114 100% 
Slovakia  2 0.9% 211 99.1%       213 100% 
France  573 3.0%       18,483 97.0% 19,056 100% 
Germany  2 0.1% 1,907 99.9%       1,909 100% 
Spain      10,671 100.0%     10,671 100% 
UK  67 0.6%     10,604 99.4%   10,671 100% 
  2,730  4,446  10,671  10,604  18,483  47,008  
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Panel E: Year 2007 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 
Total % 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.0%       2,049 100% 
Poland  2,251 100.0%       2,251 100% 
Hungary  114 100.0%       114 100% 
Slovakia  213 100.0%       213 100% 
France  605 3.2%     18,451 96.8% 19,056 100% 
Germany  1,909 100.0%       1,909 100% 
Spain      10,671 100.0%   10,671 100% 
UK  40 0.4% 10,705 99.6%     10,745 100% 
  7,181  10,705  10,671  18,451  47,008  
 
Panel F: Year 2008 
  Cluster 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Czech R. 19 0.9%   2,030 99.1%           
Poland  29 1.3%     2,222 98.7%         
Hungary  114 100.0%               
Slovakia  213 100.0%               
France  277 1.5% 3,741 19.6%           15,038 78.9% 
Germany  10 0.5%       1,899 99.5%       
Spain            10,671 100.0%     
UK              10,745 100.0%   
  662  3,741  2,030  2,222  1,899  10,671  10,745  15,038  
 
Panel G: Year 2009 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 
Total % 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Czech R. 5 0.2% 2,044 99.8%     2,049 100% 
Poland  4 0.2% 2,247 99.8%     2,251 100% 
Hungary  114 100.0%       114 100% 
Slovakia  213 100.0%       213 100% 
France  364 1.9%     18,692 98.1% 19,056 100% 
Germany  1 0.1% 1,908 99.9%     1,909 100% 
Spain      10,671 100.0%   10,671 100% 
UK  10745 100.0%       10,745 100% 
  11,446  6,199  10,671  18,692  47,008   
 
All analyses are significant at 1%.  
  
 
Annex 5: Cluster analysis of combined period of 2003-2009. Number of firms and the percentage of each country by cluster division 
 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 5 Total 
firms %   No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Czech R. 40 0.3% 14,303 99.7%           14,343 100% 
Poland 63 0.4% 15,694 99.6%             15,757 100% 
Hungary 798 100.0%                 798 100% 
Slovakia 1,491 100.0%                 1,491 100% 
France               133,392 100.0% 133,392 100% 
Germany 2 0.0% 13,361 100.0%             13,363 100% 
Spain       74,697 100.0%         74,697 100% 
UK 247 0.3%         74,968 99.7%     75,215 100% 
 2,641  43,358  74,697  74,968  133,392  329,056  
            Significant at 1%.  
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Annex 6: Cluster analysis by year within two fixed clusters. Number of firms and the percentage of each country by cluster division 
 
Panel A: Year 2003 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
Total firms % 
  No. % No. % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland 2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France 54 0.30% 19,002 99.70% 19,056 100% 
Germany 1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain 10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK 19 0.20% 10,726 99.80% 10,745 100% 
  17,280   29,728   47,008   
 
Panel B: Year 2004 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
Total firms % 
  No. % No. % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland 2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France 63 0.30% 18,993 99.70% 19,056 100% 
Germany 1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain 10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK 8 0.10% 10,737 99.90% 10,745 100% 
  17,278   29,730   47,008   
 
Panel C: Year 2005 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
Total firms % 
  No. % No. % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland 2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France 38 0.20% 19,018 99.80% 19,056 100% 
Germany 1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain 10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK 10,745 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,745 100% 
  27,990   19,018   47,008   
 
Panel D: Year 2006 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
Total firms % 
  No. % No. % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland 2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France 73 0.40% 18,983 99.60% 19,056 100% 
Germany 1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain 10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK 8 0.10% 10,737 99.90% 10,745 100% 
  17,288   29,720   47,008   
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Panel E: Year 2007 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
Total firms % 
  No. % No. % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland 2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France 26 0.10% 19,030 99.90% 19,056 100% 
Germany 1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain 10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK 10,745 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,745 100% 
  27,978   19,030   47,008   
 
Panel F: Year 2008 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
Total firms % 
  No. % No. % 
Czech R. 3 0.10% 2,046 99.90% 2,049 100% 
Poland 5 0.20% 2,246 99.80% 2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France 19,056 100.00% 0 0.00% 19,056 100% 
Germany 0 0.00% 1,909 100.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain 10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK 0 0.00% 10,745 100.00% 10,745 100% 
  30,062   16,946   47,008   
 
Panel G: Year 2009 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
Total firms % 
  No. % No. % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland 2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France 124 0.70% 18,932 99.30% 19,056 100% 
Germany 1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain 10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK 10,745 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,745 100% 
  28,076   18,932   47,008   
                                                All analyses are significant at 1%.  
 
Annex 7: Cluster analysis of combined period of 2003-2009 within two fixed clusters.  
Number of firms and the percentage of each country by cluster division 
 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
Total firms % 
  No. % No. % 
Czech R. 14,343 100.00% 0 0.00% 14,343 100% 
Poland 15,757 100.00% 0 0.00% 15,757 100% 
Hungary 798 100.00% 0 0.00% 798 100% 
Slovakia 1,491 100.00% 0 0.00% 1,491 100% 
France 849 0.60% 132,543 99.40% 133,392 100% 
Germany 13,363 100.00% 0 0.00% 13,363 100% 
Spain 74,697 100.00% 0 0.00% 74,697 100% 
UK 160 0.20% 75,055 99.80% 75,215 100% 
  121,458   207,598   329,056   
                                                   Significant at 1%.  
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